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THE SUPREME COURT AND WASHINGTON V. DA VIS--A
RATIONALE FOR RACISM?
JOHN

I.

D.

DAVIS

INTRODUCTION

In no other areas more than civil rights and civil liberties does the American
justice system brush more intimately with the most fundamental social issues
of our nation. For that reason, advocates of civil rights and civil liberties
greeted the retirement announcements of each Warren Court member with
considerable dismay-a consternation matched only by the trepidation with
which they awaited the appointments of the Nixon nominees to the Supreme
Court. As first one, then two, three, and finally, four members of the most
liberal Supreme Court bench in history succumbed to the rigors of age, fatigue
and infirmity, the prophets of doom began to sound their forecasts for the
deathknell of civil rights. As each Warren Court justice stepped down, the
cries of the harbingers of civil rights doom became more strident, and the
anxiety within the hearts of civil rights advocates grew. Almost with a hush,
civil libertarians settled back to await what they were certain would be
wholesale reversals of all their hard-fought gains achieved during the previous two decades.
Those twenty years were the culmination of almost fifty years of struggle
during which the alienated and powerless in our society, through prayers,
parades and activism had sensitized and educated the Great Society and its
courts to respond with legislative programs and judicial decisions that gave
them some promise that the justice, equality and brotherhood upon which this
country was founded might at last be within reach of the desperate grasps of
our disadvantaged and oppressed. But with the inception of the era of Benign
Neglect and a once-again conservative court, most civil rights advocates
forecast a steady erosion of the principles of fairness, as the political and
economic scions of the country demand that order receive primacy even over
justice, and the anti-Warren Court status quo be resurrected.
Slowly, at first, and now with a frequency and boldness most apparent in
the area of criminal procedure, the current Supreme Court has begun to justify
the fears of many that some of the more liberal Warren Court decisions will be
overruled. In the area of racial discrimination the Burger Court, while
obviously desirous of delimiting the gains made by Blacks in employment and
school desegregation, has rendered a number of judgments inconsistent with
that judicial philosophy. Especially in employment discrimination, there
have been some landmark holdings to the advantage of Black Americans'
* Director of the NBA, EEOC Law Project. J.D. 1971, University of Denver; A.B. 1964,
Wabash College. Mr. Davis acknowledges the research assistance of Herschelle Reed, J.D. 1976,
Howard University.
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efforts to seek redress from two and one-half centuries of involuntary
servitude, and one hundred and thirteen (and still counting) years of rejection,
oppression, and economic deprivation. Indeed, these cases have increased the
potential for social progress. However, Washington v. Davis', decided June
7, 1976, is not one of those cases. This article attempts to comment on the
case, in terms of why it is not, why and how it should have been, and what
attorneys (especially Black attorneys) need to do in order to get the most
positive decisions from a negative judicial framework.
II.

BACKGROUND OF CASE

This case began in April of 1970 when two Black police officers of the
Metropolitan Police Department (hereinafter MPD) of the District of Columbia filed suit in federal district court2 against the Mayor (then Commissioner)
of the District of Columbia, the Commissioners of the United States Civil
Service Commission, 3 and the Metropolitan Police Department's Chief. The
complaint was amended eight months later to a class action alleging racially
discriminatory promotion policies by the Metropolitan Police Department
and sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment for damages and other
relief. Two other Blacks were allowed to intervene, their complaint alleging
that their applications for hire as police officers had been rejected because the
MPD's recruitment and hiring policies were racially discriminatory against
Blacks. One of the series of personnel practices complained of was the use of
a written pre-employment test (hereinafter Test 21) which, their complaint
stated, disqualified a disproportionately high number of Black applicants.
The plaintiffs alleged that the personnel practices in question violated their
rights under the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, and under the District of
Columbia Code, Section 1-320.'
Test 21 is a verbal communications examination specifically testing
vocabulary, reading and comprehension. It is administered generally to
prospective government employees, and was developed by the Civil Service
Commission, not by the police department. Plaintiffs challenged the test in
1. 44 U.S.L.W. 4789 (U.S. June 7, 1976).
2. 348 F. Supp. 15 (D.C. 1972) (Gesell, D.J.).
3. District of Columbia employees, including the police department, are federal employees
who are hired according to the United States civil service regulations, as set forth in tit. 5 C.F.R.
§§ 3300, et seq. (C.S.C.).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) is the equal protection statute, and D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 1-320
(West Supp. 1970) mandates non-discrimination on the basis of religion, residence, race, color or
national origin in recruitment and hiring for positions in the District of Columbia government.
Until Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (1970)) was amended
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 to extend coverage to the Federal Government, most cases brought against racial discrimination in Federal employment were brought
under the fifth amendment's guarantee of due process of law. This case is one such case. Most
cases brought since the effective date of the 1972 amendments are brought under Title VII,
whose standards were applied by many Federal judges to pre-1972 cases.
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federal district court as not being related to job performance and as having a
discriminatory impact on Black applicants. After considerable pre-trial
discovery, and a number of cross-motions for summary judgment focusing
solely on Test 21, the plaintiffs showed that:
(1) The number of Black police officers on the MPD was not
proportionate to the population percentage of the Distri j
(2) A substantially higher number of Blacks failed Ttst 21 than
whites.
(3) The test has not been validated to establish its reliability for
measuring subsequent job performance.'
The federal district court accepted this showing as sufficient to shift the
burden of proof to the defendants to demonstrate the validity of the test.
However, the court dismissed the case, granting the defendants' motion for
summary judgment based on what it considered to be the defendants'
affirmative efforts to recruiteBlacks, and on the relative percentage of Blacks
on the police force in proportion to Blacks in the recruitment area. The court
went on to hold that the test was a useful indicator of training school
performance, which obviated the need to show actual job performance
validation, and consequently did not discriminate against otherwise qualified
6
Blacks.
Plaintiffs appealed 7 on a constitutional issue asserting that the use of Test
21 invidiously discriminated against Blacks, constituting a fifth amendment
denial of due process. The court of appeals decided the case under Title VII
standards, as set forth in Griggs v. Duke PowerCompany,8 and held that Test
21 was illegal because it had a disproportionate impact on Blacks and was not
shown by defendant-appellees to be satisfactorily related to successful
performance of the job of a police officer. The district court said that plaintiffs
had not claimed there was "an intentional discrimination or purposeful
discriminatory act" 9 and, therefore, the "proof is wholly lacking that a police
officer qualifies on the color of his skin rather than ability".' o The court of
appeals, in reversing the district court, declared that the lack of discriminatory
intent was irrelevant to the main issue-the effect of the Test-and that a
constitutional violation was established where the test in question disproportionately excluded Blacks in comparison to Whites and where there was no
proof that the Test had been validated as a predictor of job performance.
5. Supra note 2, at 16.
6. Id. at 17.
7. 512 F.2d 956 (1975) (Robinson, C.J.).
8. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Burger, C.J.).
9. 348 F. Supp. at 16.

10. Id.
11. 512 F.2d at 960, quoting the Supreme Court in Griggs (supranote 8): "Congress directed
the thrust of the [Civil Rights] Act to the consequences [sic] of employment practices," the Court
admonished, "not simply the motivation." 401 U.S. 424, 432.
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III.

THE DECISION

The United States Supreme Court granted the defendant-appellees their
petition for certiorari, 12 and in June of 1976 the case was decided. The Court
reversed the court of appeals, concentrating on the difference between
constitutional claims of discrimination and those brought under Title VII:
As the Court of Appeals understood Title VII, employees or applicants proceeding under it need not concern themselves with the
employer's possibly discriminatory purpose, but instead may focus
solely on the racially differential impact of the challenged hiring or
promotion practices. This is not the constitutional rule. 3
In the paragraph immediately proceding the one quoted above, the Court
has said that:
Although the petition for certiorari did not present this ground for
reversal, our Rule 40(I)(d)(2) provides that we "may notice a plain
error not presented ....
.14
The Supreme Court read Test 21 as a racially neutral criterion that has a
disproportionate racial impact, but saw it as serving a valid governmental
purpose which, therefore, standing alone, would not trigger the rule that
racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are to be
justified only by the weightiest of considerations.' 5 In fact, the Court
explicitly states its difficulty in understanding how any such racially neutral
criterion can ever be discriminatory and a denial of equal protection of the
laws "simply because a greater proportion of Negroes fail to qualify than
6
members of other racial or ethnic groups."'
IV.

THE MEANING OF THE CASE

Washington v. Davis has to be read as redefining the meaning of unconstitutional invidious discrimination. The Court is saying that, henceforth, a
law or official governmental act which has a disparate effect on Blacks (or
other minorities) is not unconstitutional unless it can be shown that the law or
act was perpetrated with a discriminatory intent or purpose. That the Court
feels intent to be the overriding consideration is shown by its use of the words
"intent" and "purpose" no less than thirty times in the decision. This is the
Court's holding, despite the fact that the sole issue before both the court of
appeals and the Supreme Court was whether or not Test 21 was valid, given its
disproportionate impact against Blacks and hence its denial of their right to
due process of law under the fifth amendment.
The Court was obviously persuaded by the comparatively progressive
12. 423 U.S. 820 (1975). The appeal was filed by the District of Columbia government, the
Civil Service Commission declining to petition for writ of certiorari, instead filing a brief as
respondents.

13.

II EPD

14.

Id.

10,958 at 8047, 44 U.S.L.W. at 4791.

15. Id. at 4792.
16. Id. at 4794.
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record of the MPD in recruiting a sufficient number of Black applicants to
cause a significant change in its racial composition. 17 However, the Court's
eagerness to accept the MPD's "affirmative" recruitment efforts as proof of
the absence of discriminatory intent, coupled with its professed "ignorance"
that supposedly neutral criteria can be racially discriminatory 18 forecasts a
gloomy future for civil rights advocates in this country.
By giving intent such primacy, even over effect, the Court is ignoring the
history of the civil rights movement in this country. More importantly, the
Court is making bad law as regards the rights of Black people in this country.
Now, in order for Blacks to prove a constitutional violation of civil rights, the
discrimination complained of must be shown to be intentional or purposeful.
This multiplies the burden of proof for the plaintiff, who now must not only
show that some government criterion or act has a disparate effect on Blacks as
a class, but also that such disparity is intentionally afflicted. This is an
extremely difficult task, especially when one reads the inconsistencies to be
found in the Davis case.
We have mentioned the Court's obsession with intent by the police
department, while ignoring both the effects of the Test, and the lack of
validatior evidence. The record in the case shows that four times as many
Blacks failed the Test as Whites (57% to 13%, respectively). ' 9 Additionally,
there was never any evidence brought forward to indicate the Test was
job-related. 20 In fact, the only evidence on the record indicated that the Test
was not job-related.2"
The Supreme Court's rationale for ignoring the weight of this evidence is
merely to state that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of
invidious racial discrimination is not identical to the statutory standard, 22
which they held not to apply here. Nevertheless, the Court went on to sustain
the District Court's finding that Test 21 could be validated by showing its
relatedness to the police training program, 23 and that to find Test 21 so
validated would not foreclose Griggs24 or Albermarle Paper Company v.
Moody. 25 Thus, the Court first said it was an error for the court of appeals to
apply a statutory standard to the case, and then addressed statutory issues in
26
the same opinion.
17. ". .we
think the District Court correctly held that the affirmative efforts of the
Metropolitan Police Department to recruit black officers, the changing racial composition of the
recruit classes and of the force in general, . . . negated any inference that the Department
discriminated on the basis of race ....
Id.
18.

Supra note 16.

19. 512 F.2d 960.
20.

512 F.2d 961.

21. 512 F.2d 964, n. 44 (cited in the decision at note il).
22. Supra note 13.
23. 11 EPD 10, 958, 44 U.S.L.W. at 4793.
24. Id. at 4791, note 8.
25. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
26. See Dissent, Brennan, J., 44 U.S.L.W. at 4796.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1976

5

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1976], Art. 7
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
Let us summarize what has happened thus far. First, the case is brought to
enjoin the use of a Civil Service test because it has a disproportionate impact
on Black applicants. Next, the test is upheld, not because of proof of its
validity, but because the district court ruled that the defendants' affirmative
efforts to recruit Black applicants somehow imputed lack of discriminatory
intent thru the use of the Test. Third, the court of appeals reversed, stating that
Title VII standards can appropriately be applied in a situation involving
disproportionate impact and job relatedness, in which case the Test must fail
absent evidence of validity. Finally, the Supreme Court overruled the court of
appeals, sustaining the use of the Test, and said that it was error to apply
statutory standards to constitutional issues. All of these decisions were
reached because of, or in spite of, a lack of evidence to rebut the plaintiff's
initial prima facie case, which showed the Test to be discriminatory in its
effect on Blacks, and lacking a job validation study. 27 Yet, the Court ignored
all of the above and based its decision for the defendants on the plaintiffs'
28
failure to show any discriminatory purpose in the use of the Test.
After stating that intent is the critical factor in Davis, the Court went on to
cite a school desegregation case- Wright v. Council of the City of
Emporia29-as an example of a circumstance in which "the racial impact of a
law, rather than its discriminatory purpose, is the critical factor.'" 30 Although
it cites Wright as an example to be distinguished from Davis, the Court held
Keyes v. School District No. 31 as the prevailing law to determine equal
protection where racial discrimination is claimed. The Keyes case, which is
the Denver public school desegregation case, was decided almost completely
upon the school district's "purpose or intent to segregate.' '32 Thus, intent is
controlling in an equal protection controversy involving invidious racial
discrimination-but not always, according to the Court.
The Court is not clear as to the type of proof necessary to show an equal
protection violation; "this is not to say that the necessary discriminatory
racial purpose must be express or appear on the face of the statute, or that a
law's disproportionate impact is irrelevant in cases involving Constitutionbased claims of racial discrimination." 33 In some cases, states the Court,
statistics may be used which show ". . . systematic exclusion . . absence
of Negroes . . . the totality of the relevant facts . . . disproportionate
exclusion. . . circumstances [in which] the discrimination is very difficult to
27. a) The number of Black police officers in the Police Department is not proportionate to
the population mix of the District of Columbia, b) A higher percentage of Blacks fail Test 21 than

Whites, c) Test 21 has not been validated to show its reliability for measuring job performance.
348 F. Supp. at 16.
28. 44 U.S.L.W. 4791.
29. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
30. 44 U.S.L.W. 4793.
31. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
32. 413 U.S. at 211.
33. 44 U.S.L.W. 4791.
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explain on non-racial grounds. . . ." 34 When such evidence is construed as
making out a prima facie case, "the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut
the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible
racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the mono35
chromatic result."
Does this mean that a showing of disproportionate impact, coupled with
proof that there was a history of exclusion of Blacks from a particular line of
governmental employment, is enough to invoke a prima facie showing of
unconstitutionality? Not if the Davis case stands, because that is exactly what
the plaintiffs showed. What about statistical disparity, history of exclusion
and the absence of any criteria or standards for ruling on employment tests?
Again, not under Davis.
V.

CONCLUSION

What, then, is the meaning of Davis? The case says nothing new in the area
of intent. It is essentially a restatement of the law (and widely accepted law,
too) that unconstitutional intent can seldom be inferred from effect alone. The
policy in the Davis case, Test 21, was racially neutral even though the results
of the Test, its effect, were not. And, although the plaintiffs did make out a
prima facie case at the district court level, 36 the Supreme Court sidestepped
the issue by reversing on the grounds that no evidence of discriminatory intent
or segregative purpose, the crucial elements in distinguishing the constitutional standard from the statutory standard, was shown.
That the Supreme Court is on solid ground, however arguably, can be
shown by a long line of cases leading up to this decision. 37 This is not to say
that more liberal courts, from similar facts adduced at trial, have not found for
the plaintiffs in employment cases involving equal protection from state and
municipal employment discrimination. 38 However, the cases cited are all
appellate court decisions, none having reached the Supreme Court on the
intent issue, and all involving circumstances wherein minorities and women
were almost virtually excluded from the police force. With the Metropolitan
Police Department, however, there have always been a substantial number
(when compared to other large cities) of Blacks on the force. But, the
population mix of Blacks in the District of Columbia is 75%, which means
34. Id.
35. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), quoted in 44 U.S.L.W. at 4792.
36. Supra note 27.
37. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Keyes v. School District No. I, supranote 31;
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Alexander v. Louisiana, supra note 35; Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71(1971); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376U.S. 52
(1964).
38. Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029(3rd Cir. 1973); Chicano Police Officers Assoc. v.
Stoner, 526 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1976); Kirkland v. N.Y. State Department of Correctional
Services, 520 F.2d 420 (2nd Cir. 1975); Bridgeport Guardians v. Bridgeport Civil Service
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2nd Cir. 1972). See 512 F.2d 960, n.2.
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that at its current rate of hiring, Blacks will never constitute more than
45-50% of all officers on the MPD.
What we wind up with in Davis is a case of first impression, on a number of
counts:
a) Black plaintiffs suing a government headed by a Black mayor and
city council.
b) A police department, that, although it has a history of failing to
recruit and hire Blacks, recently embarked upon an effective recruitment effort directed towards Blacks.
c) An employment discrimination suit brought under the fifth amendment, citing statutory standards.
d) A decision that would have been just the opposite had the case been
brought under Title VII.
Given the facts of the case, one cannot but conclude that this was not a good
case for litigation. The Supreme Court had the intent theory ready for use; the
facts of the case are arguable as to whether or not intent could be proved; there
was no precedent for allowing a statutory standard to control a constitutional
issue; and the minority profile of the MPD was already better than that of any
major city in the United States, and steadily improving. In deciding the case,
the Supreme Court majority (7-2) has shown that it is not at all attuned to the
subtleties and nuances of racial discrimination, but can perceive racism only
when it is so overt as to be blatant. After all, one is forced to ask, how serious
can the MPD be in its efforts to recruit Black police officers when it continues
to use an unvalidated, non-police developed, twenty-year old test that rejects
Blacks at a rate four times greater than Whites? Especially considering the
tremendous amount of taxpayers' money that has been spent to develop
culturally-fair police and fire examinations in such cities as San Francisco,
New York, and Dallas?
But, had this case been won by plaintiffs, it would not have provided a
remedy against public employers not already in existence (at least since
1972). 39 And except for being able to make out a pure theory of racial
discrimination in employment, under the fifth amendment, little stood to be
gained. But in light of the anti-Black responses already coming in from the
circuits 4° and other courts, 41 in response to Davis, the case may haunt us for a
long time to come. Hopefully, we can get some legislation that will require
strict standards of review whenever racial discrimination is claimed as a
constitutional violation. Also, we must lobby Congress for even stricter
requirements for affirmative action plans by government contractors, and
more rigid monitoring by government agencies enforcing civil rights
regulations.
The decision in Davis came like a slap in the face to many. Thanks, we
39. SeeSection 717, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended). 42 U.S.C. 2000e.
40. Cf. Arnold v. Ballard, 12 EPD 9 11224 (1976).
41. See Richardson v. McFadden, 45 U.S.L.W. 2130 (1976).
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needed that. Many civil rights advocates are of late increasingly drawn into
those intellectual arguments about "reverse discrimination" goals versus
quotas, preferential treatment, etc.
These abstract mental exercises do nothing but obscure the real truth, and
that is that we are not even close to winning the war against discrimination. In
the twelve years since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, we have made
little actual progress towards our proclaimed goals of equality without
reference to race, sex, religion, national origin or skin color. In that respect,
the Davis case is a timely reminder that ours is still a racist social order.
Many civil rights attorneys have deceived themselves into believing the
Boilerplate Law in civil rights is settled, and all that remains in dispute are the
finer points. This unfortunate and dangerous self-delusion has led many black
lawyers into believing that the civil rights struggle is no longer in need of their
services, and they now devote their talents to pursuits irrelevant to the black
community.
The laws are on the books. But they have not yet worked for most of us, nor
will they become a reality, unless all of us, as attorneys, return to our former
pasture of viligance and perseverence in pursuit of the still-undelivered
freedom and equality promised by our constitution.
The Supreme Court has put the ball in our hands. The burden as always is
on us. Now more than ever, we must shoulder it and carry on.
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